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Abstract—Recent advances in sensing, computing, and net-
working have paved the way for the emerging paradigm of
Mobile Crowd Sensing (MCS). The openness of such systems
and the richness of data MCS users are expected to contribute
to them raise significant concerns for their security, privacy-
preservation and resilience. Prior works addressed different
aspects of the problem. But in order to reap the benefits of
this new sensing paradigm, we need a holistic solution. That is, a
secure and accountable MCS system that preserves user privacy,
and enables the provision of incentives to the participants.
At the same time, we are after a MCS architecture that is
resilient to abusive users and guarantees privacy protection
even against multiple misbehaving and intelligent MCS entities
(servers). In this work, we meet these challenges and propose
a comprehensive security and privacy-preserving architecture.
With a full blown implementation, on real mobile devices, and
experimental evaluation we demonstrate our system’s efficiency,
practicality, and scalability. Last but not least, we formally assess
the achieved security and privacy properties. Overall, our system
offers strong security and privacy-preservation guarantees, thus,
facilitating the deployment of trustworthy MCS applications.
Index Terms—Mobile Crowd Sensing, Security, Privacy, Incen-
tive Mechanisms
I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile Crowdsensing [1] (MCS) has emerged as a novel
paradigm for data collection and collective knowledge forma-
tion practically about anything, from anywhere and at anytime.
This new trend leverages the proliferation of modern sensing-
capable devices in order to offer a better understanding of
people’s activities and surroundings. Emerging applications
range from environmental monitoring [2] to intelligent trans-
portation [3, 4] and assistive healthcare [5].
MCS users are expected to contribute sensed data tagged
with spatio-temporal information which, if misused, could
reveal sensitive user-specific information such as their where-
abouts and their health condition. Even worse, data contri-
butions are strongly correlated with the current user context
(e.g., whether they are at home or at work, walking or driving,
etc.); there is a significant risk of indirectly inferring daily
routines or habits of users participating in MCS applications.
By inferring user context, one can obtain deeper insights into
individual behavior, thus, enabling accurate user profiling [6].
As recent experience shows, assuming that users can simply
trust the MCS system they contribute sensitive data to, is no
longer a viable option. Therefore, it becomes imperative to
ensure user privacy in mobile crowdsensing scenarios.
Furthermore, although privacy protection will facilitate user
participation it cannot, per-se, ensure it. This is critical since
if users do not engage in great numbers, thus, providing
a sufficient influx of contributions, MCS systems will not
succeed. In the absence of intrinsic motivation, providing
incentives becomes vital [7]. Indeed, the research community
has identified various forms of incentives based on monetary
rewards [8], social or gaming-related mechanisms [9] along
with methods for incorporating them in MCS systems [10,
11]. In particular, micro-payments have been shown effective
in encouraging user participation and increasing their produc-
tivity.
However, the common challenge is providing incentives
in a privacy-preserving manner; users should be gratified
without associating themselves with the data they contribute.
One possible solution the literature has proposed is the use
of reverse auctions, among anonymous data providers and
requesters [8]. Such schemes necessitate user participation
throughout the whole duration of a task. However, MCS users
may join and leave sensing campaigns at any time, thus,
making the implementation of such auction-based mechanisms
impractical [12]. Moreover, the employed incentive provision
methods must be fair: (selfish) users should not be able
to exploit them and gain inordinate, to their contributions,
utilities.
At the same time, aiming for the participation of any user
possessing a sensing-capable device is a double-edged sword:
participants can be adversarial seeking to manipulate (or even
dictate) the MCS system output by polluting the data collection
process. Even worse, detecting offending users and sifting their
malicious contributions is hindered by the desired (for privacy-
protection) user anonymity. What we need is mechanisms that
can hold offending users accountable, but without necessarily
disclosing their identity.
Motivation & Contributions: To reap the benefits of this
new community sensing paradigm we must work towards
three directions; incentivizing user participation, protecting
the users from the system (i.e., ensuring their privacy) and,
at the same time, protecting the system from malicious users
(i.e., holding them accountable of possible system-offending
actions). Despite the plethora of existing research efforts, the
state-of-the-art in the area of secure and privacy-preserving
MCS systems still lacks comprehensive solutions; most works
either focus solely on user privacy without considering ac-
countability or they facilitate incentive provision in a non-
privacy-preserving manner (i.e., by linking users to their
contributions). Therefore, the design of secure and privacy-
preserving MCS systems, capable of insentivizing large-scale
user participation, is the main challenge ahead.
To meet this challenge, we extend SPPEAR [13], the state-
2of-the-art security and privacy architecture for MCS systems
focusing on: (i) security, (ii) privacy, (iii) accountability and
(iv) incentive provision. More specifically, although SPPEAR
offers broadened security and privacy protection under weak
trust assumptions (where even system entities might try to
harm user privacy), it does not capture the complete landscape
of all possible privacy repercussions that such attacks entail.
We also extend SPPEAR’s simplistic receipt-based rewarding
mechanism into a solution that fairly remunerates participating
users while supporting different incentive mechanisms includ-
ing, but not limited to, micro-payements. Overall, the sug-
gested architecture provides high user-privacy assurance, while
facilitating the ample participation of extrinsically motivated
users.
We provide an implementation of our system on real mobile
devices and extensively assess its efficiency and practicality.
Furthermore, we present a formal analysis of the achieved
security and privacy properties in the presence of strong
adversaries. To better examine the privacy implications of such
a broadened adversarial model, we also provide the first, to
the best of our knowledge, instantiation of inference attacks
(in the domain of MCS) that “honest-but-curious” system
entities can launch against user privacy. More specifically, we
show how such entities can extract sensitive user information
(i.e., whereabouts, activities) by leveraging machine learning
techniques and we discuss possible mitigation strategies.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Sec. II
presents the related work in the area of secure and privacy-
preserving MCS systems. We, then, describe the system and
adversarial models for our scheme (Sec. III) and discuss the
envisioned MCS security and privacy requirements (Sec. IV).
In Sec. V, we provide an overview of the system and the
services it offers followed by a detailed presentation of all
implemented components and protocols (Sec. VI). Sec. VII
presents a rigorous formal assessment of the achieved prop-
erties. The experimental setup, used to evaluate our system,
along with the performance results are presented in Sec. VIII,
before we conclude the paper in Sec. IX.
II. RELATED WORK
The security and the privacy of MCS have attracted the
attention of the research community [14, 15]. Several works
try to protect user privacy by anonymizing user contributed
data [16, 17] and obfuscating location information [18]. Ad-
ditionally, other research efforts employ generalization [19] or
perturbation [20] of user contributions; i.e., deliberately reduc-
ing the quality and the quantity of the information users submit
to the MCS system. Nevertheless, although such techniques
can enhance user privacy they do not capture the full scope of
privacy-protection; knowing that a user participates in sensing
campaigns monitoring, for example, noise pollution during
early morning hours already reveals sensitive information such
as the coarse-grained location of her home [21]. Moreover,
strong privacy-protection must hold even in the case that MCS
system entities cannot be trusted: i.e., they are curious to learn
and infer private user information.
AnonySense [16] is a general-purpose framework for se-
cure and privacy-preserving tasking and reporting. Reports
are submitted through wireless access points, while leverag-
ing Mix Networks to de-associate the submitted data from
their sources. However, the way it employs group signatures
(i.e., [22]), for the cryptographic protection of submitted
reports, renders it vulnerable to Sybil attacks (Sec. VII).
Although AnonySense can evict malicious users, filtering out
their faulty contributions requires the de-anonymization of
benign reports1; besides being costly, this process violates the
anonymity of legitimate participants. Misbehavior detection
may occur even at the end of the sensing task when all
contributions are available. On the contrary, our system shuns
out offending users and sifts their malicious input through an
efficient revocation mechanism (Sec. VI-D) that does not erode
the privacy of benign users.
Group signature schemes can prevent anonymity abuse by
limiting the rate of user authentications (and, thus, of the
samples they submit), to a predefined threshold (k) for a
given time interval [23]. Exceeding this threshold is considered
misbehavior and results in de-anonymization and revocation.
Nonetheless, this technique cannot capture other types of
misbehavior, i.e., when malicious users pollute the collected
data by submitting (k − 1) faulty samples within a time
interval. In contrast, our scheme is misbehavior-agnostic and
prevents such anonymity abuse by leveraging authorization
tokens and pseudonyms with non-overlapping validity periods
(Sec. VII).
PEPSI [17] prevents unauthorized entities from querying the
results of sensing tasks with provable security. It leverages
a centralized solution that focuses on the privacy of data
queriers; i.e., entities interested in sensing information without
considering accountability and privacy-preserving incentive
mechanisms. PEPPeR [24] protects the privacy of the infor-
mation querying nodes (and, thus, not of the information con-
tributing nodes), by decoupling the process of node discovery
from the access control mechanisms used to query these nodes.
PRISM [25] focuses on the secure deployment of sensing
applications and does not consider privacy.
In PoolView [26] mobile clients perturb private measure-
ments before sharing them. To thwart inference attacks, lever-
aging the correlation of user data, the authors propose an
obfuscation model. The novelty of this scheme is based on
the fact that although private user data cannot be obtained,
statistics over them can be accurately computed. PoolView
considers only privacy of data streams and, thus, does not
consider on accountability for misbehaving users.
In [27] the authors propose a privacy-preserving data re-
porting mechanism for MCS applications. The intuition be-
hind this work is that user privacy is protected by breaking
the link between the data and the participants. Nonetheless,
opposite to our work, the proposed scheme solely focuses on
privacy and, thus, does not consider incentive mechanisms and
accountability for misbehaving users.
Addressing aspects beyond the scope of this work, in [28]
the authors propose a reputation-based mechanism for assess-
ing the data-trustworthiness of user contributed data. Similarly,
1Submitted by users that belong to the same cryptographic group as the
revoked ones.
3SHIELD [29] leverages machine learning techniques to detect
and sift faulty data originating from adversarial users seeking
to pollute the data collection process. In this work, we assume
the existence of such a scheme capable of assessing the overall
contributions made by anonymous users.
A significant body of work in the area of MCS focuses on
the provision of incentives to stimulate user participation [10,
30, 8]. These works leverage mechanisms such as auctions,
dynamic pricing, monetary coupons, service quotas and rep-
utation accuracy. However, they do not consider user privacy
and, thus, can leak sensitive information by linking the identity
of users with the data they contribute. The approach presented
in [31] tries to enhance user privacy by remunerating users
according to their privacy exposure: as the privacy exposure
of users increases, better services (e.g., QoS-wise) and rewards
are offered to them as compensation.
III. SYSTEM & THREAT MODEL
System Model: We consider generic MCS systems com-
prising the following entities:
Task Initiators (TI), (Information Consumers): Orga-
nizations or individuals initiating data collection campaigns
by recruiting users and distributing sensing tasks to them.
The TI initiates sensing tasks and campaigns. Each task is
essentially a specification of the sensors users must employ,
the area of interest, and the lifetime of the task. The area of
interest is the locality within which participating users must
contribute data and it can be defined either explicitly (e.g.,
coordinates forming polygons on maps) or implicitly (through
annotated geographic areas, e.g., Stockholm). In any case, it
is divided into regions that can correspond to, for example,
smaller administrative areas (e.g., municipalities) comprising
the area of interest.
Users (Information Producers): Operators of sensing-
capable mobile devices (e.g., smart-phones, tablets), and nav-
igation modules (e.g., GPS). Devices possess transceivers
allowing them to communicate over wireless local area (i.e.,
802.11a/b/g/n) and (or) cellular networks (3G and LTE).
Back-end Infrastructure: System entities responsible for
supporting the life-cycle of sensing tasks: they register and
authenticate users, collect and aggregate user-contributed re-
ports and, finally, disseminate the results (in various forms) to
all interested stake-holders.
Threat Model: MCS can be abused both by external
and internal adversaries. The former are entities without any
established association with the system; thus, their disruptive
capabilities are limited. They can eavesdrop communications
in an attempt to gather information on user activities. They
might also manipulate the data collection process by con-
tributing unauthorized samples or replaying the ones of benign
users. Nonetheless, such attacks can be easily mitigated by
employing simple encryption and access control mechanisms.
External adversaries may also target the availability of the
system by launching, for example, jamming and (D)DoS
attacks. However, such clogging attacks are beyond the scope
of this work and, therefore, we rely on the network operators
(e.g., Internet Service Providers (ISPs)) for their mitigation.
Internal adversaries are legitimate participants of the system
that exhibit malicious behavior. We do not refer only to human
operators with malevolent intentions but, more generally, to
compromised devices (clients), e.g., running a rogue version
of the MCS application. Such adversaries, can submit faulty,
yet authenticated, reports during the data collection process.
Their aim is to distort the system’s perception of the sensed
phenomenon, and thus, degrade the usefulness of the sensing
task. For instance, in the context of traffic monitoring cam-
paigns [3], malicious users might contribute false information
(e.g., low velocities) to impose a false perception of the
congestion levels of the road network. Such data pollution
attacks can have far graver implications if malicious users
impersonate other entities or pose with multiple identities (i.e.,
acting as a Sybil entity).
Internal adversaries may also have a strong motive to
manipulate the incentive provision mechanism. For instance,
leveraging their (for privacy protection) anonymity, they could
try to increase their utility (e.g., coupons, receipts) without
offering the required contributions.
At the same time, internal attacks can target user privacy,
i.e., seek to identify, trace and profile users, notably through
MCS-specific actions2. This is especially so in the case
of honest-but-curious and information-sharing infrastructure
components; i.e, entities (Sec. V) that execute the protocols
correctly but are curious to infer private user data by (possibly)
colluding with other entities in the system (Sec. VII-B).
IV. SECURITY & PRIVACY REQUIREMENTS
In this work, we aim for accountable yet privacy-preserving
MCS architectures that can integrate advanced incentive mech-
anisms. Definitions of the expected security and privacy re-
quirements follow:
• R1: Privacy Preserving Participation: Privacy preserva-
tion in the context of MCS mandates that user participation is
anonymous and unobservable. More specifically, users should
contribute to sensing tasks without revealing their identity.
Identities are both user (e.g., name, email address) and device-
specific; e.g., device identifiers such as the International Mo-
bile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) and the International Mobile
Station Equipment Identity (IMEI).
Furthermore, external (e.g., cellular providers) or internal
(i.e., MCS infrastructure entities or users) observers should not
be able to infer that anonymous users have (or will) contribute
to specific sensing tasks. Inferring that a user will participate in
a task that measures noise pollution during night hours within
an area A could leak sensitive user information such as home
location and personal activities (among others).
User-contributed data should be unlinkable: no entity having
access to user reports (i.e., information users contribute to the
MCS system) should be able to link reports to the users from
which they originated or to infer whether two or more reports
were contributed by the same user.
• R2: Privacy-Preserving & Fair Incentive Mechanisms:
2For instance, user de-anonymization by examining the content of the
reports they submit [16]
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Users should be rewarded for their participation without as-
sociating themselves to the data they contribute. Furthermore,
incentive mechanisms must be resilient; misbehaving or selfish
users should not be able to exploit them for increasing their
utility without making the necessary contributions.
• R3: Communication Integrity, Confidentiality and Au-
thentication: All system entities should be authenticated and
their communications should be protected from any alteration
by and disclosure to unauthorized parties.
• R4: Authorization and Access Control: Participating
users should act according to the policies specified by the
sensing task. To enforce such policies, access control and
authorization mechanisms must be in place.
• R5: Accountability: Offending users should be held
accountable for any disruptive or system-harming actions.
• R6: Data Verification: MCS systems must provide the
necessary means to identify and sift faulty data originating
from, potentially, misbehaving users.
V. SYSTEM ENTITIES
In this section, we begin with an overview of the system en-
tities (Fig. 1) comprising our architecture and we, then, move
on explaining how trust relations are established amongst
them:
• Mobile Client: Users download a mobile client on
their devices. This application collects and delivers sensed
information by interacting with the rest of the infrastructure.
• Group Manager (GM): It is responsible for registering
user devices to sensing tasks, issuing them anonymous cre-
dentials. The GM authorizes the participation of devices (in
tasks) in an oblivious manner, using authorization tokens.
• Identity Provider (IdP): This entity authenticates user
devices and mediates their participation to sensing tasks.
• Pseudonym Certification Authority (PCA): It provides
anonymized ephemeral credentials (digital certificates), termed
pseudonyms, to the users (mobile clients). Pseudonyms (i.e.,
the corresponding private/public keys) can cryptographically
protect (i.e., ensure the integrity and the authenticity) infor-
mation that clients submit. For unlinkability purposes, devices
can obtain multiple pseudonyms from the PCA.
Reporting Service (RS): Mobile clients submit samples to
this entity responsible for storing and processing the collected
data. Although privacy-preserving data processing could be
Notation Meaning
TI Task Initiator
GM Group Manager
IdP Identity Provider
PCA Pseudonymous Certification Authority
RS Reporting Service
RA Resolution Authority
PKx Public key of authority X
PRx Private key of authority X
tr Sensing task request
gski Group signing key
gpk Group public key
PS Pseudonym
t Authorization token
transient Transient SAML identifier
r Report receipt
σX Signature of authority X
φi Shapley value of user i
TABLE I: Abbreviations & Notations
employed, we neither assume nor require such mechanisms;
this is orthogonal to our work and largely depends on the
task/application. The RS issues receipts to participants later
used for redeeming rewards.
• Revocation Authority: This entity is responsible for re-
voking the anonymity of offending devices (e.g., devices that
disrupt the system or pollute the data collection process).
Our goal is to separate functions across different entities,
according to the separation-of-duties principle [32]: each
entity is given the minimum information required to execute
the desired task. This is to meet the requirements (Sec. IV)
under weakened assumptions on system trustworthiness; in
particular we achieve strong privacy protection even in the
case of “honest-but-curious” infrastructure. Sec. VII further
discusses these aspects.
Trust Establishment: To establish trust between system
entities (Fig. 1), we leverage Security Assertion Markup
Language (SAML) assertions that represent authentication and
authorization claims, produced by one entity for another. To
establish trust between the IdP and the PCA, a Web Service
(WS)-Metadata exchange takes place. Metadata are XML-
based entity descriptors containing information including au-
thentication requirements, entity URIs, protocol bindings and
digital certificates. The metadata published by the IdP contain
the X.509 certificates the PCA must use to verify the signatures
of the assertions produced by the IdP. The PCA publishes
metadata that contain its digital identifier and certificates.
To verify authorization tokens (Sec. VI-A), the IdP pos-
sesses the digital certificate of the GM. The pseudonyms issued
to user devices are signed with the PCA private key. New tasks
are signed by the TIs and verified by the GM. Finally, the RS
possess the digital certificate of the PCA.
The confidentiality and the integrity of the communication
is guaranteed by end-to-end authenticated Transport Layer
Security (TLS) channels established between the devices and
the MCS entities (i.e., IdP, PCA, RS). Furthermore, to pre-
vent de-anonymization on the basis of network identifiers,
mobile clients can interact with system entities via the TOR
anonymization network [33].
VI. PRELIMINARIES & SYSTEM PROTOCOLS
As depicted in Fig. 1, the TI creates and signs task requests
(tr) with a private key (PRTI ) of an ECDSA key-pair and
5Algorithm 1 Authorization Token Acquisition
Initialization Phase(GM) Transfer Phase(GM & DV)
Data: N generated authenti- Data: Computed token com-
cation tokens mitments Yi,j
Begin Begin
1. GM  S : [
√
N,
√
N ] 1. GM  {rR, rC}
2. GM  2
√
N random keys 2. Randomize row & column keys:
(R1, ..., R
√
N
), (C1, ..., C
√
N
), (R1 · rR, , ..., R√N · rR)
for each Row & Column (C1 · rC, ..., C√N · rC )
3. for every Xi,j in S do 3. If device wishes Xi,j
GM  {Ki,j , Yi,j}, where then
Ki,j = g
RiCj , where OT
√
N
1 [GM,DV ]
Pick−−−→ Ri · rR
{Gg, g} DDH−−−→ {Grp,Genr} OT
√
N
1 [GM,DV ]
Pick−−−→ Cj · rC
Yi,j = commitKi,j (Xi,j) end
end 4. GM sends g
1
rRrC
3. GM sends to the device 5. Device reconstructs
Y1,1, ..., Y
√
N,
√
N Ki,j = g
( 1
rRrC
Ri)·rRCj ·rC
6. Obtain Xi,j by opening Yi,j with
Ki,j
End End
sends them to the GM. The public key (PKTI ) is certified
and known to the GM.
Upon reception of a tr, the GM challenges the TI with
a random nonce to verify that it is actually the holder
of the corresponding PRTI . Then, the GM instantiates a
group signature scheme that allows each participant (Pi) to
anonymously authenticate herself with a private group signing
(gski). The GM pushes the group public key (gpk) to the IdP
that is responsible for authenticating users.
Group signatures fall into two categories: static (fixed
number of group members) and dynamic (dynamic addition of
group participants). Selecting the appropriate scheme depends
on the sensing task. For instance, sensing campaigns requiring
the participation of only “premium” users can be accommo-
dated by static group signature schemes since the number of
participants is known. Otherwise, dynamic group signatures
are necessary. Our system supports, but is not limited to,
two schemes; Short Group Signatures [22] (static) and the
Camenisch-Groth scheme [34] (dynamic).
Clients receive task descriptions (tr) through a Pub-
lish/Subscribe announcement channel. They can automatically
connect (i.e., subscribe) and receive all task descriptors, tr,
immediately after they are published by the GM. Each client
can employ task filtering based on the device’s current location
so that users are presented with only those tasks for which
they can accommodate the specified area of interest. If a user
is willing to participate in a task, she authorizes her device to
obtain the group credentials (i.e., gski) and an authorization
token from the GM (Sec. VI-A). Then, the device initiates the
authentication protocol with the IdP and obtains pseudonyms
from the PCA (Sec. VI-B). With these pseudonyms the device
can (anonymously) authenticate the samples it submits to the
task channel and receive the corresponding payment receipts
(Sec. VI-C).
A. Registration & Authorization Token Acquisition
To participate in a sensing task, the mobile client registers
with Group Manager (GM) to obtain the private group key key
gski by initiating an interactive JOIN protocol with the GM.3
This protocol guarantees exculpability: no entity can forge
signatures besides the intended holder of the key (gski) [35].
Subsequently, the GM generates an authorization token
dispenser, Dauth. Each token of the dispenser binds the client
identity with the identifier of each active task. This binding
is done with secure and salted cryptographic hashes. Tokens
are also signed by the GM to ensure their authenticity. More
specifically, the dispenser is a vector of tokens, Dauth =
[t1, t2, ..., tN ], where each token, ti, has the form:
ti = {tid, h(userid || taski ||n), taski}σGM
where N is the number of currently active sensing tasks, n
is a nonce, and tid is the token identifier.
To participate in a task, the device must pick the cor-
responding token. Nevertheless, merely requesting a token
would compromise users’ privacy; besides knowing real user
identity, the GM would learn the task she wishes to contribute
to. For instance, knowing a user participates in a sensing task
measuring noise pollution during night hours within an area
“A”, can help the GM deduce the user home location [36].
To mitigate this, we leverage Private Information Re-
trieval (PIR) techniques. Currently, our system supports the
“Oblivious Transfer with Adaptive Queries” protocol [37].
The scheme has two phases (see Alg. 1): the initialization
phase, performed by the GM, and the token acquisition phase
involving both the device and the GM. For the former, the
GM generates and arranges the N authorization tokens in a
two-dimensional array, S, with
√
N rows and
√
N columns.
Then, it computes 2
√
N random keys, (R1, R2, ..., R√N ),
(C1, C2, ..., C√N ), and a commitment, Yi,j , for each element
of the array. These commitments are sent to the device.
During the token acquisition phase, the GM randomizes the
2
√
N keys with two elements rR and rC . Then, the device
initiates two Oblivious Transfer sessions to obtain the desired
token, Xi,j ; one for the row key, Ri · rR, and another for the
column key, Cj · rC . After receiving g
1
rRrC , from the GM,
and with the acquired keys, the device can now obtain Xi,j
by opening the already received commitment, Yi,j .
The security of this scheme relies on the Decisions Diffie-
Helman assumption [37]. As the token acquisition protocol
leverages oblivious transfer, the GM does not know which
token was obtained and, thus, cannot deduce the task the user
wishes to contribute to. In Sec. VIII we present a detailed
performance analysis of the PIR scheme.
B. Device Authentication
Having the signing key, gski, and the authorization token,
ti, the device can now authenticate itself to the IdP and receive
pseudonyms from the PCA. Pseudonyms are X.509 certificates
binding anonymous identities to public keys. Fig. 2 illustrates
the protocol phases:
Phase 1: The mobile client generates the desired amount of
key-pairs and creates the same number of Certificate Signing
Requests (CSRs) (Step 1).
3Due to space limitations, we refer the reader to [22, 34]
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Phase 2: The client then submits the generated CSRs to
the PCA to obtain pseudonyms (Step 2). Since the device is
not yet authenticated, the PCA issues a SAML authentication
request (Step 3) to the IdP, signed with its private key and
encrypted with the public key of the IdP. SAML requires that
requests contain a random transient identifier (transientid)
for managing the session during further execution of the
protocol. The request is then relayed by the device to the IdP
(Step 4), according to the protocol bindings agreed between
the PCA and the IdP during the metadata exchange (Sec. V).
Phase 3: The IdP decodes and decrypts the authentica-
tion request, verifies the XML signature of the PCA and
initiates the authentication process. As aforementioned, our
authentication is based on group signatures. In particular, the
IdP sends a challenge (in the form of a timestamp/nonce)
to the device (Step 5). The device, then, produces a group
signature on the challenge with its signing key gski. It also
submits the token, ti, obtained by the GM (Step 6). The IdP
verifies the challenge with the use of the gpk (obtained from
the GM). Upon successful authentication (Step 7), the IdP
generates a SAML authentication response signed with its
private key and encrypted with the public key of the PCA.
The response contains the transientid and an authentication
statement (i.e., assertion): this asserts that the device was
successfully authenticated (anonymously) through a group
signature scheme and it includes the authorization token and
the access rights of the device. Finally, the SAML response is
encoded and sent back to the device (Step 8).
Phase 4: The device delivers the SAML assertion to the
PCA (Step 9), which decrypts it and verifies its signature and
fields (Step 10). Once the transaction is completed, the device
is authenticated and it receives valid pseudonyms (Step 11).
Each pseudonym has a time validity that specifies the period
(i.e., the pseudonym life time) for which it can be used. The
PCA issues pseudonyms with non-overlapping life times (i.e.,
pseudonyms are not valid during the same time interval).
Otherwise, malicious users could expose multiple identities
simultaneously, i.e., launch Sybil attacks.
C. Sample Submission and Incentives Support
With the acquired pseudonyms, the device can now partic-
ipate in the sensing task by signing the samples it contributes
and attaching the corresponding pseudonym. More specifically,
each sample, si, is:
si = {v || t || (loc) ||σPrvKey ||Ci}
where v is the value of the sensed phenomenon, t is a
time-stamp and σPrvKey is the digital signature, over all the
sample fields, generated with the private key whose public
key is included in the pseudonym Ci. The loc field contains
the current location coordinates of the device. In Sec. VII-C,
we analyze the privacy implications due to device location
in samples. Upon reception of a sample, the RS verifies its
signature and time-stamp, against the time validity of the
pseudonym. If the sample is deemed authentic, the RS prepares
a receipt, ri, for the device:
ri = {receiptid || regioni || taskid || time ||σRS}
σRS is the digital signature of the RS. regioni is the region
(Sec. III) including the loc specified in the submission si. The
device stores all receipts until the end of the task.
D. Pseudonym Revocation
If required, our system provides efficient means for shun-
ning out offending users. Assume a device whose (anony-
mously) submitted samples significantly deviate from the rest.
This could be an indication of misbehavior; e.g., an effort
to pollute the results of the task. We refrain from discussing
the details of such a misbehavior detection mechanism and
we refer the reader to SHIELD [29], the state-of-the-art data
verification framework for MCS systems. Misbehaving devices
should be prevented from further contributing to the task. On
the other hand, it could also be the case that the devices
equipped with problematic sensors must be removed from the
sensing task. To address the above scenarios, we design two
grained revocation protocols, suitable for different levels of
escalating misbehavior:
Total Revocation: The Resolution Authority (RA) coor-
dinates this protocol based on a (set of) pseudonym(s) PSi
(Fig. 3). Upon completion, the device owning the pseudonym
is evicted from the system:
Phase 1: The RA provides the PCA with the PSi (Step
1). The PCA, then, responds with the authorization token, ti,
included in the SAML assertion that authorized the generation
of pseudonym PSi (Step 2). This token is then passed by the
RA to the GM (Step 3).
Phase 2: Based on the received ti, the GM retrieves the
whole token dispenser, Dauth, that included ti. This dispenser
is sent to the IdP (Step 4) that blacklists all its tokens and sends
back a confirmation to the GM (Steps 5, 6). From this point
on, the device can no longer get authenticated because all of
its tokens were invalidated.
Phase 3: To revoke the already issued pseudonyms, the
GM sends the dispenser, Dauth, to the PCA that determines
which of these tokens it has issued pseudonyms for. It, then,
updates its Certificate Revocation List (CRL) with all the not
yet expired pseudonyms of the device (Steps 7, 8), forbidding
it essentially from (further) submitting any samples to the RS.
Partial Revocation: This protocol evicts a device from a
specific sensing task. The RA sends the pseudonym, PSi,
to the PCA, which retrieves the token, ti, from the SAML
7assertion that authorized the issuance of PSi. Consequently,
the PCA revokes all the pseudonyms that were issued for ti.
As a device is issued only one token per task, and this is now
revoked, the device can no longer participate in this specific
task. The partial revocation protocol does not involve the GM
and, thus, it does not revoke anonymity of devices.
Overall, in order for the RA to revoke the credentials of
a device, the synergy between multiple system entities is
required; i.e., the PCA, the GM and the IdP. As mentioned
above, this is due to the separation-of-duties principle as each
entity is given the minimum information to execute the desired
task. The increased trustworthiness of our system, i.e., its
resilience in the presence of honest-but-curious system entities,
comes at the price of a moderate overhead due to communi-
cation involving multiple entities of the infrastructure.
E. Task Finalization & User Remuneration
Upon completion of the sensing task, our system remu-
nerates users for their contribution. In case the remuneration
mechanism mandates, for example, micro-payments, each task
description (i.e., the corresponding tr) specifies the amount of
remuneration, B, that users will share.
This process is initiated when the completion of the task is
announced to the publish/subscribe channel (Sec. VI). Upon
reception of this finalization message, participants provide the
TI with all the receipts they collected for their data submis-
sions (Sec. VI-C). The TI must then decide on a fair allocation
of the tasks’ remuneration amount (to the participating users)
based on the level of contribution (i.e., number of submitted
data samples) that each individual user had. To do this, we use
Shapley value [38], an intuitive concept from coalitional game
theory that characterizes fair credit sharing among involved
players (i.e., users). This metric allows us to fairly quantify
the remuneration of each user. Each user will be remunerated
with an amount equal to φi ·B. To compute φi the TI works
as follows:
1) Shapley Value: Let N be the total number of participat-
ing users. For each subset of users (coalition) S ⊂ N , let v(S)
be a value describing the importance of the subset of users S.
For a value function v the Shapley value is a unique vector
φ = [φ1(v), φ2(v), ..., φN (v)] computed as follows:
φi(v) =
1
|N |!
∑
Π
[v(PΠi ∪ i)− v(PΠi )] (1)
where the sum is computed over all |N |! possible orders
(i.e., permutations) of users and PΠi is the set of users
preceding user i in the order Π. Simply put, the Shapley value
of each user is the average of her marginal contributions.
Computing the Shapley value for tasks with a large number
of participants is computationally inefficient due to the com-
binatorial nature of the calculation. Nonetheless, an unbiased
estimator of the Shapley value is the following [38]:
φˆi(v) =
1
k
∑
Π
[v(PΠi ∪ i)− v(PΠi )] (2)
where k is the number of randomly selected user subsets
(coalitions) to be considered; it essentially determines the error
between the real value and its estimate.
RA PCA GM IdP
1.PSi
2.ti
3.ti
4.Dauth
5.invalidation
6.OK
7.Dauth
8.cert.revocation
9.OK
10.OK
Fig. 3: Pseudonym Revocation
2) Defining the value function v: Our goal is to remunerate
users based not only on the number of their data submissions
but also on the spatial dispersion of their contributions. Intu-
itively, this mechanism should favor reports submitted for re-
gions where the system perception of the sensed phenomenon
is low (i.e., less received data samples). On the other hand,
the value accredited to similar, or possibly replayed (i.e., the
same measurement for the same region), samples should be
diminished.
To achieve this, we devise the value function, v, as follows:
Let R = [R1, R2, ..., RN ] be the number of receipts the TI
receives from each user. The value v(S) of a coalition S is
computed as:
v(S) = H(RS) ·
∑
i∈S
Ri (3)
RS is the vector defining the number of samples this
coalition has contributed for each region. For instance, let us
assume a task for which the area of interest is divided into
four regions [regα, regβ , regγ , regδ]. Moreover, let S2 be a
coalition of two users each of which has submitted one sample
to each of the regions. In this case, RS = [2, 2, 2, 2]. H(RS)
is Shannon’s entropy:
H(RS) = −
∑
pi · log(pi) (4)
where pi is the proportion of samples, conditional on
coalition S, in region i. H(RS) is equal to 1 when all regions
have received the same number of samples. In this case,
the value of a coalition, v(S), is the sum of samples that
participating users contributed to the task. If a coalition is
heavily biased towards some regions, then H tends to 0 and,
thus, v(S) will be equal to some (small) fraction of the sum
of samples.
The above described remuneration protocol must be exe-
cuted on top of a data verification mechanism, such as [29],
that can detect and sift untrustworthy user contributions and,
in combination with the revocation protocol (Sec. VI-D), evict
malicious users without gratifying them.
VII. SECURITY AND PRIVACY ANALYSIS
We begin with a discussion of the security and privacy of our
system with respect to the requirements defined in Section IV.
We then proceed with a formal security and privacy analysis.
Communications take place over secure channels (TLS).
This ensures communication confidentiality and integrity. Fur-
thermore, each system entity possesses an authenticating dig-
ital certificate (R3).
8In our scheme, the GM is the Policy Decision Point, which
issues authorization decisions with respect to the eligibility of
a device for a specific sensing task. The IdP is the Policy
Enforcement Point which authorizes the participation of a
device on the basis of authorization tokens (R4).
Malicious devices can inject faulty reports to pollute the data
collection process. For instance, consider a traffic monitoring
task in which real-time traffic maps (of road networks) are
built based on user submitted location and velocity reports. By
abusing their anonymity or, if possible, by launching a Sybil
attack, misbehaving users can impose a false perception over
the congestion levels of the road network. Schemes (e.g., [16])
relying on group signatures for authenticating user reports are
vulnerable to abuse: detecting if two reports were generated
by the same device mandates the opening of the signatures of
all reports, irrespectively of the device that generated them.
Besides being costly4, this approach violates the privacy of
legitimate users.
We overcome this challenge with the use of authorization
tokens: they indicate that the device was authenticated, for
a given task, and that it received pseudonyms with non-
overlapping lifetimes. This way, the PCA can corroborate the
time validity of the previously issued pseudonyms and, if
requested by the device, provide it with new pseudonyms that
do not overlap the previously issued ones. Thus, adversarial
devices cannot exhibit Sybil behavior since they cannot use
multiple pseudonyms simultaneously. Nevertheless, re-using
pseudonyms for cryptographically protecting multiple reports,
trades-off privacy (linkability) for overhead (Sec. VII-C).
The employed Private Information Retrieval scheme pre-
vents a curious GM from deducing which task a user wishes
to participate in. Moreover, devices get authenticated to the IdP
without revealing their identity (i.e., group-signatures). Finally,
pseudonyms allow devices to anonymously, and without being
linked, prove the authenticity of the samples they submit.
By using multiple pseudonyms (ideally one per report) and
by interacting with the RS via TOR, devices can achieve
enhanced report unlinkability. Furthermore, TOR prevents
system entities and cellular ISPs from de-anonymizing devices
based on network identifiers (R1). Essentially, with end-to end
encryption and TOR, our system prevents ISPs from gaining
any additional information from the participation to a sensing
task.
The first two columns of Table II present the information
each system entity possesses. Our approach, based on the
separation of duties principle, prevents single infrastructure
entities from accessing all user-sensitive pieces of information
(colluding system entities are discussed in Sec. VII-B).
The employed cryptographic primitives ensure that offend-
ing users cannot deny their actions. More specifically, the
interactive protocols, executed during the registration phase
(Sec. VI-A), guarantees that gski is known only to the device
and as a result, exculpability is ensured [22]. Furthermore,
digital signatures are generated with keys known only to the
device and thus, non-repudiation is achieved.
4Due to space limitations we refer the reader to [22]
Datum Entity Secrecy Strong Secrecy/
Unlinakbility
Dev. id (id) GM X X
Auth. Token (t) IdP, PCA X X
Subm. sample. (s) RS X X
Device pseud. (PS) RS, PCA X X
Receipt (r) RS X X
TABLE II: Secrecy Analysis for Dolev-Yao Adversaries
Our system can shun out offending devices (Sec. VI-D)
without, necessarily, disclosing their identity (R1, R5). To
achieve permanent eviction of misbehaving mobile clients the
registration phase can be enhanced with authentication meth-
ods that entail network operators (e.g., GBA [3]). However,
we leave this as a future direction.
We consider operation in semi-trusted environments. In
particular, a PCA can be compromised and issue certificates
for devices not authenticated by the IdP. If so, the PCA does
not possess any SAML assertion for the issued pseudonyms,
and thus, it can be held culpable for misbehavior. Moreover,
the IdP cannot falsely authenticate non-registered devices: it
cannot forge the authorization tokens included in the SAML
assertions (Sec. VI-B). As a result, the PCA will refuse issuing
pseudonyms and, thus, the IdP will be held accountable.
Moreover, SAML authentication responses (Sec. VI-B) are
digitally signed by the IdP and thus cannot be forged or
tampered by malicious devices. Overall, in our system, one
entity can serve as a witness of the actions performed by
another; this way we establish a strong chain-of-custody (R5).
A special case of misbehavior is when a malicious RS seeks
to exploit the total revocation protocol (Sec. VI-D) to de-
anonymize users. To mitigate this, we mandate that strong
indications of misbehavior are presented to the RA before the
resolution and revocation protocols is initiated. Nonetheless,
such aspects are beyond the scope of this work.
Malicious users cannot forge receipts since they are signed
by the RS. Furthermore, they are bound to specific tasks
and thus they cannot be used to earn rewards from other
tasks. Colluding malicious users might exchange receipts.
Nevertheless, all receipts are invalidated, by the TI, upon
submission and, thus, they cannot be “double-spent” (R2).
Receipts, generated by the RS, are validated by the TI,
neither of which knows the long-term identity of the user.
As a result, the incentive mechanism protects user anonymity.
Finally, although our system does not assess the trustwor-
thiness of user contributed data (i.e., R6) it can seamlessly
integrate data verification schemes, such as [29].
For the correctness of the employed cryptographic primi-
tives (i.e., group signature, PIR schemes) we refer to [22, 34,
37]. In what follows, we focus on the secrecy and strong-
secrecy properties of our system in the presence of external
adversaries and infomration-sharing honest-but-curious system
entities.
A. Secrecy against Dolev-Yao adversaries
We use ProVerif [39] to model our system in pi-Calculus.
System entities and clients are modeled as processes and
protocols (i.e., authentication, Sec. VI-B, sample submission,
Sec. VI-C, revocation, Sec. VI-D) are parallel composition of
multiple copies of processes. ProVerif requires sets of names
9Honest-but-curious
(colluding) entities
Information
Linked
Privacy Implications
GM - No sensitive information can be inferred.
IdP t The IdP can simply infer that an anonymous user wishes to participate in a task.
PCA PS, t The PCA will infer that an anonymous user wishes to receive pseudonyms for a given task.
RS s, PS, r The RS knows that a given report was submitted for a specific sensing task.
GM, IdP t, id The GM and the IdP can infer that a user with a known identity wishes to participate to a specific task.
GM, PCA t, id, PS The GM and the PCA can infer that a user with a user with a known identity wishes to participate to a specific task
and has received pseudonyms.
GM, RS s, PS, r When the GM and the RS collude they can infer that a report was submitted by a pseudonymous user.
IdP, PCA t, PS These authorities can infer that an anonymous user received pseudonyms for a specific task.
PCA, RS t, PS, s, r The PCA and the RS can infer that an anonymous user received pseudonyms for a specific task and has submitted a
report.
GM, PCA, RS all Full de-anonymization of the user, the task she participates in and the reports she has submitted.
TABLE III: Honest-but-curious entities with ProVerif.
and variables along with a finite signature, Σ, comprising all
the function symbols accompanied by their arity. The basic
cryptographic primitives are modeled as symbolic operations
over bit-strings representing messages encoded with the use of
constructors and destructors. Constructors generate messages
whereas destructors decode messages.
ProVerif verifies protocols in the presence of Dolev-Yao
adversaries [40]: they can eavesdrop, modify and forge mes-
sages according to the cryptographic keys they possess. To
protect communications, every emulated MCS entity in the
analysis maintains its own private keys/credentials. This model
cannot capture the case of curious and information-sharing
MCS system entities (discussed in Sec. VII-B).
In ProVerif, the attacker’s knowledge on a piece of infor-
mation i, is queried with the use of the predicate attacker(i).
This initiates a resolution algorithm whose input is a set of
Horn clauses that describe the protocol. If i can be obtained
by the attacker, the algorithm outputs true (along with a
counter-example) or false otherwise. ProVerif can also prove
strong-secrecy properties; adversaries cannot infer changes of
secret values. To examine if strong-secrecy properties hold
for a datum i, the predicate noninterf is used. We evaluate
the properties of all specific to our system data. Table II
summarizes our findings: our system guarantees not only the
secrecy but also the strong-secrecy of all critical pieces of
information and, thus, it preserves user privacy.
Since Dolev-Yao adversaries cannot infer changes over the
aforementioned data. For instance, adversaries cannot relate
two tokens, t1 and t2, belonging to the same user; the
same holds for the other protocol-specific data (e.g., samples,
receipts).
B. Honest-but-curious System Entities
We consider the case of colluding (i.e., information-sharing)
honest-but-curious system entities aiming to infer private user
information. We model such behavior in ProVerif by using
a spy channel, accessible by the adversary, where a curious
authority publishes its state and private keys. To emulate col-
luding infrastructure entities, we assume multiple spy channels
for each of them. We set the adversary to passive: she can
only read messages from accessible channels but not inject any
message. For this analysis we additionally define the following
functions in ProVerif:
MAP (x, y) = MAP (y, x)
LINK(MAP (x, a),MAP (a, y)) = MAP (x, y)
The first is a constructor stating that the function
MAP is symmetric. The second is a destructor stating
that MAP is transitive. For example, whenever the de-
vice submits an authorization token to the IdP it holds
that MAP (ANON USERα, tokenx) (i.e., an anonymous
user, α, wants to authenticate for task x). Of course, the
GM (and, thus, the adversary listening to the spy chan-
nel in case the GM is honest-but-curious) also knows
MAP (tokenx, USERα). In case these two entities col-
lude, querying MAP (ANON USERα, USERα) yields
true; these colluding entities know that a user, with a
known identity, participates in a task. Similarly we can is-
sue other queries (e.g., (MAP (USERα, PSEUDONYMy),
MAP (USERα, REPORTy)). Table III presents the pieces
of information that is known or can be inferred (along
with their semantics) for various combinations of honest-but-
curious colluding entities.
Single system entities cannot de-anonymize users as they
have limited access to user information (Table II). Fur-
thermore, our system is privacy-preserving even when two
authorities collude. To completely de-anonymize users and
their actions, it is required that the GM, the PCA and the
RS collaborate. Of course, if these entities are deployed
within different administrative domains, their collusion is
rather improbable. Nonetheless, if they are within the same
administrative domain, the separation-of-duties requirement no
longer holds; thus, user privacy cannot be guaranteed.5
C. Pseudonyms and Protection
To evaluate the unlinkability achieved by pseudonyms, we
consider the following MCS application: drivers, with the use
of their smart-phones, report their current location and velocity
to the RS. We assume that the RS is not trusted: it performs
no aggregation or obfuscation of the submitted data but rather
tries to create detailed location profiles for each vehicle,
by linking successive location samples submitted under the
same or different pseudonyms. Various techniques leveraging
location information and mobility can simulate such attacks.
Here we emulate such adversarial behavior with a Kalman
filter tracker. We consider 250 vehicles and a geographic area
of 105 urban road links in the city of Stockholm. We generate
mobility traces with the SUMO [3] microscopic road traffic
simulator. Our aim is to understand the privacy implications
5Please note that any distributed architecture would fail to preserve privacy
in this scenario.
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of varying pseudonym utilization policies. In Fig. 4 (a), we
plot the fraction of vehicles that our tracker tracked for more
than 50% of their trip, as a function of the report submission
frequency (from 10 s to 5min period interval) for different
pseudonym (re)usage policies, i.e., the number of reports
signed under the same pseudonym.
The tracker tracks 37% of the vehicles6 for a reporting
frequency of 10 s and a use of 1 pseudonym per report
(maximum unlinkability). Nonetheless, its success decreases
for more realistic reporting frequencies: the tracker receives
less corrections and, thus, produces worse predictions. On the
other hand, using the same pseudonym for multiple samples
trades-off privacy for overhead (but not significantly). For
a sampling frequency of 1 report/min, we observe that
approximately 5% of the vehicles are tracked for more than
50% of their trips. Similarly, by reusing the same pseudonym
for 5 samples, 27% of the vehicles are tracked for more than
50% of their trips. Overall, the effect of pseudonym reuse
weakens as the sampling frequency decreases to frequencies
relevant to the MCS context, i.e., 1 report/30s.
In Fig. 4 (b), we show that as the number of users increases,
so does the overall privacy offered by pseudonyms. For
instance, for 100 simulated vehicles, with a sampling rate of
10 s, and changing pseudonyms every 10 samples, we see that
almost 100% of all vehicles can be tracked for more than 50%
of their trips. Nonetheless, as the population of participating
vehicles grows, the tracker’s accuracy deteriorates because the
RS receives more location samples and, thus, the probability
of erroneously linking two successive samples also increases.
Simply put, users can better hide inside large crowds.
D. Inferring User Context from Sensor Readings
For this analysis we assume the worst-case scenario in terms
of privacy: we assume that user samples are linked and this
linking is facilitated by the limited user mobility (e.g., being
at home) and by the fact that they submit multiple samples
under the same pseudonym. The honest-but-curious RS might
attempt to infer the user context (i.e., activities: walking,
driving, sleeping) from those linked sensor readings [6, 41].
The rest of this section discusses instantiations of such privacy
attacks and evaluates the effectiveness of different mitigation
strategies.
1) Adversarial Instantiation: We leverage machine learning
mechanisms for predicting the user context. More specifically,
we assume that an honest-but-curious RS has a statistical
model of possible sensor values characterizing different user
contexts. Such knowledge can be obtained by, e.g., user(s)
cooperating with the RS. What the RS essentially needs
is labeled training sets: values from various sensors (e.g.,
accelerometer) mapped to specific contexts or activities.
After obtaining training sets, the honest-but-curious RS
instantiates an ensemble of classifiers to predict the context of
the participating users. For the purpose of this investigation,
we use Random Forests: collections of decision trees, each
trained over a different bootstrap sample. A decision tree is
6Please note that the regularity of vehicular movement works in favor of
the tracker.
a classification model created during the exploration of the
training set. The interior nodes of the tree correspond to
possible values of the input data. For instance, an interior node
could describe the values of a sensor s1. Nodes can have other
nodes as children, thus, creating decision paths (e.g., s1 > α
and s2 < β). Tree leafs mark decisions (i.e., classifications)
of all training data described by the path from the root to the
leaf. For example, samples for which sensors s1 and s2 take
the values s1 > α, s2 < β describe the walking activity. After
training, the RS can classify user contexts based on the sensor
values sent by their mobile clients.
2) Attack Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies: For the
analysis, we employ the PAMAP7 dataset which contains
sensor readings (i.e., accelerometer, gyroscope, magnetome-
ter) from 17 subjects performing 14 different activities (e.g.,
walking, cycling, laying, ironing, computer work). We con-
sider only a subset of the included sensor types focusing
on those that are already available in current smart-phones:
temperature (Samsung Galaxy S4 has a dedicated temperature
sensor), accelerometer, gyroscope and magnetometer. For each
evaluation scenario, we select one subject (at random) for
training the classifier ensemble and, then, examine its accuracy
for the rest of the dataset subjects. We additionally consider
two of the most well-know mitigation strategies against such
inference attacks, and assess their effectiveness: (i) suppress-
ing sensor readings (i.e., contributing samples according to
some probability) and (ii) introducing noise to the submitted
measurements.
As shown in Fig. 5 (a), the overall ensemble classification
accuracy (for different user contexts) is above 50%. This
serves as an indication that an honest-but-curious RS can
effectively target user contextual privacy. Fig. 5 (b) illustrates
the classification accuracy when one of the previously de-
scribed mitigation strategies is employed. In particular, we
assume that users can either introduce some kind of error to
their submitted measurements or decide, according to some
probability (i.e., suppression threshold), whether to submit a
sample or not. What we see is that when the suppression
probability increases, the accuracy of the classifier decreases.
This is to be expected because the classifier receives less
samples and, thus, produces worse predictions. Moreover, as
the figure shows, introducing noise in the data samples can
also improve user privacy.
Not submitting enough samples results in the accumulation
of fewer receipts by the client (Sec. VI-C): simply put,
this strategy trades-off rewards and credits for better privacy
protection. At the same time, anomaly detection mechanisms
can flag samples to which an error has been deliberately
introduced. Overall, although orthogonal to this work, the fine-
tuning of these (or similar) mitigation strategies merits further
investigation.
Fig. 5 (c) presents the informativeness of the employed
sensor types with respect to user contexts. We express “sensor
importance” as the (normalized) total reduction of uncertainty
brought by that feature (i.e., the Gini importance [42]). As
it can be seen, magnetometers and gyroscopes are the most
7http://www.pamap.org/demo.html
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Fig. 5: Inferring User Context: (a,b) Classification Accuracy, (c) Sensor Evaluation.
intrusive sensors as they reveal the most about a user’s context.
By leveraging such knowledge, participating users can have an
estimation on their (possible) privacy exposure prior to their
participation in a sensing task; simply by examining the types
of sensors the task requires.
VIII. SYSTEM PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. System Setup
The IdP, GM, PCA, and RA are deployed, for testing
purposes, on separate Virtual Machines (VMs) with dual-
core 2.0 GHz CPUs. We distribute the services provided by
PCA over two VMs for our dependability evaluation (the
same can be applied to the other entities, but we omit the
discussion due to space limitations). We use the OpenSSL
library for the cryptographic operations, i.e., the Elliptic Curve
Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) and TLS, and the JPBC
library for implementing the group signature schemes. We
deployed the sensing application on different Android smart-
phones with 4-Cores/1 GB RAM and 2-Cores/1 GB RAM. For
the evaluation of Sec. VIII-C we employ Jmeter to emulate
multiple devices accessing the infrastructure concurrently.
For sample submission and verification, we employ the
ECDSA with keys computed over 224 bit prime fields
(secp224k1 curve), thus, achieving a 112 bit security [43].
B. User-Side Evaluation
Figure 6 illustrates the performance of the authentication
and pseudonym acquisition protocol (Sec. VI-B) on the two
mobile devices. For this evaluation, devices request one au-
thorization token from a set of 10 (i.e., 10 active tasks). We
present the time needed to execute the different steps of the
algorithm (i.e., pseudonym generation, acquisition time and
authentication at the IdP), averaged over 50 observations. For
the dual-core phone, the time needed to get authenticated
and obtain 10 pseudonyms is around 8 s. This increases
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linearly as the device requests more pseudonyms: for 50
pseudonyms, the authentication protocol is executed in 22 s.
On the IdP site, authentication (based on group signatures)
requires 4 s. For the quad-core device, the protocol requires
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significantly less time (11 s for 50 pseudonyms). When using
TOR, we experience additional network latency. Due to space
limitations, we present here the results only for the quad-core
device. TOR introduces a latency of approximately 10 s, thus
raising the authentication time to 23 s for 50 pseudonyms.
Even for substantial reporting (task) periods such a number of
pseudonyms provides adequate privacy (Sec. VII-C).
We also compare the efficiency of EC-based digital signa-
tures with group-signature schemes. This comparison yields
that ECDSA with SHA512 is approximately 10 times faster
(on the quad-core device) compared to group signature
schemes (i.e., BBS scheme [22]) with the same security level.
This serves as a comparison of our system with AnonySense
[16] that relies on group signatures: as devices are expected
to submit a considerable amount of digitally signed samples,
it is critical, from the energy consumption point of view, that
the process is as efficient as possible.
Figure 7 evaluates the implemented PIR scheme: we show
the time needed to obtain an authorization token (for one task)
on the quad-core device, as a function of the number of active
tasks. This delay increases mildly with the number of active
tasks in the system. Even for a set of 100 active tasks, the PIR
protocol is executed in approximately 3.5 s.
We measure CPU utilization for the authentication protocol
on the two mobile devices (Figure 8). For the dual-core
device, the amount of CPU consumed ranges from 36%, for
10 pseudonyms, to approximately 50% for 50 pseudonyms.
For the quad-core phone, the CPU consumption significantly
drops, ranging from 20%, for 10 pseudonyms, to 23% for
50 pseudonyms. For comparison purposes, we measured the
CPU consumption of the Facebook application on the quad-
core device. On average the Facebook client consumes 18%
of the CPU, which is close to the CPU consumption of our
client on the same device (for 50 pseudonyms).
C. Infrastructure-Side Evaluation
We assess the performance of our infrastructure under
stressful, yet realistic, scenarios assuming a traffic monitoring
sensing task: the mobile devices of drivers get authenticated
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Fig. 11: Shapley Utility for different fraction of selfish users
(10% and 30%)
to our system and receive pseudonyms to protect and submit
data with respect to the encountered traffic conditions. This is a
demanding case of MCS since it entails strict location-privacy
protection requirements: users request many pseudonyms to
protect their privacy while submitting frequent location sam-
ples.
To emulate this task, we use the “TAPAS” data set [44]
that contains synthetic traffic traces from the city of Cologne
(Germany) during a whole day. We assume a request policy of
10 pseudonyms every 10 minutes, i.e. pseudonym lifetime of
1 minute each. By combining this policy with 5 000 randomly
chosen vehicular traces from the data set, we create threads
for Jmeter. Each thread is scheduled according to the TAPAS
mobility traces, with journeys specified by start and end
timestamps. Figure 9 shows that our system is efficient in this
high-stress scenario: it serves each request, approximately, in
less than 200ms. Furthermore, during the 1 hour execution
of this test, we simulate an outage of one of the two PCAs
lasting 11 minutes. As shown in the shaded area of Figure 9,
the request latency does not increase and the system recovers
transparently from the outage.
Figure 10 shows the time required for a single device
revocation, as a function of the number of pseudonyms in
the database. The RA queries the PCA for the authorization
token that the device used to request the pseudonym PS.
After retrieving the token, the RA asks the GM to translate
it to the device long term identifier. Then, the GM invalidates
all the dispenser corresponding to the token and informs the
IdP (Section VI-D). Accordingly, the PCA revokes all device
pseudonyms. These two processing delays are accounted for
as the time spent on PCA (tPCA) and GM (tGM), respectively.
The total time spent on RA is tTOT = tRA + tPCA + tGM, where
tTOT is the total execution time of revocation protocol.
The pseudonym set is generated by assuming the same
request policy for all devices. This maximizes the entropy of
the database set. Each assumed device obtained 10 tokens for
requesting a set of 10 pseudonyms per token, thus giving the
overall ratio 1 device : 10 tokens : 100 pseudonyms. The box-
plots in Figure 10 depict the results averaged over 100 runs,
with the pseudonym set increasing from 10 000 to 100 000
items linearly (i.e., we assume more devices). The performance
of the system is not significantly affected by the size of the
set. On average, revocation of a device requires 2.3 s.
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D. Remuneration Evaluation
We evaluate the proposed remuneration mechanism for
the unbiased estimator of Eq. 2. We start by assessing the
mechanism fairness assuming sensing tasks with two user
types: honest users monitoring the sensed phenomenon and
submitting samples as they move along different regions
and, selfish users that obtain a single measurement, for a
single region, and massively replay it to the RS. This way,
selfish users try to gain inordinate, to their efforts, rewards:
although they do not spend resources for sensing the monitored
phenomenon and their location, they submit samples to the
RS. To emulate such a greedy deviant behavior, we synthetize
a dataset of 40 users participating in a sensing task. Fig. 11
presents our findings: the left plot corresponds to a scenario
where the fraction of selfish users is 10%. The parameter α
of the x − axis is the replaying frequency of selfish users:
for α = 20 malicious users submit (i.e., replay) 20 times
more messages than an honest user to the RS. As the figure
shows, even for the extreme case that α = 30, selfish users
receive, on average, 25% of the total value; this is a result
of the employed value function (Sec. VI-E2): coalitions in
which selfish users participate are unbalanced; they contain
many reports for one region, and are, thus, evaluated lower
(H → 0) compared to more balanced coalitions. Increasing
the amount of selfish users to 30% yields higher utility for
them but, still, disproportional to the number of reports they
replay to the system.
Indeed, selfish users could become malicious and spoof their
device location, thus, submitting reports for regions they are
not physically present. Mitigating such behavior is orthogonal
to this investigation since it necessitates a data trustworthiness
and verification framework such as [29] or position verification
and location attestation schemes. Furthermore, shelfish users
can also share measurements: a user in region A might receive
measurements from another user, for a region B, and submit
it to the system as hers (and vice versa). This behavior can
be easily mitigated due to the our sybil-proof scheme: simply
examining the distance between samples submitted under the
same pseudonym serves as an indication of such attacks (i.e.,
when the corresponding distances are implausible).
Fig. 12 assesses the accuracy of the Shapley Estimator as a
function of the of number of sample permutations (variable k
of Eq. 2) for a sensing tasks with 40 participating users. As
we do not have any ground-truth we plot on the y− axis the
standard statistical error of the values the estimator assigns to
the different users. We observe that the relative standard error
is small. Moreover, as we trade-off efficiency for accuracy
(i.e., increasing k), the error significantly diminishes.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
Technological advances in sensing, microelectronics and
their integration in everyday consumer devices laid the ground-
work for the rise of people-centric sensing. However, its
success requires effective protocols that guarantee security
and privacy for MCS systems and their users. To meet this
challenge, we presented a novel secure and accountable MCS
architecture that can safeguard user privacy while supporting
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Fig. 12: Standard error of the estimator
user incentive mechanisms. Our architecture achieves security,
privacy and resilience in the presence of strong adversaries.
Moreover, it enables the provision of incentives in a privacy-
preserving manner; a catalyst for user participation. We for-
mally evaluated the achieved security and privacy properties
and provided a full-blown implementation of our system on
actual devices.
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